Quantum Waves are Still Physical, Regardless of Your Thoughts

Adam Frank, founder of NPR’s science and culture blog 13.7, recently published an essay on Aeon about materialism. It’s a bit confusing to get at what he’s trying to say because of the different focus its two titles have, as well as his own arguments. First, the titles. The title I saw first, which is what is displayed when shared on Facebook, is “Materialism alone cannot explain the riddle of consciousness”. But on Aeon, the title is “Minding matter”, with the sub-title or blurb of “The closer your look, the more the materialist position in physics appears to rest on shaky metaphysical ground.” The question of theories of mind is very different than philosophical interpretations of quantum mechanics.

This shows up in the article, where I found it confusing because Franks ties together several different arguments and confuses them with various ideas of “realism” and “materialism”. First, his conception of theories of mind is confusing. I’d say the average modern neuroscientist or other scholar of cognition is a materialist, but I’d be hesitant to say the average one is a reductionist who thinks thought depends very hard on the atoms in your brain. Computational theories of mind tend to be some of the most popular ones, and it’s hard to consider those reductionist. I would concede there may be too much of an experimental focus on reductionism (and that’s what has diffused into pop culture), but the debate over how to move from those experimental techniques to theoretical understanding is occurring: see the recent attempt at using neuroscience statistical techniques to understand Donkey Kong.

I also think he’s making a bit of an odd claim on reductionism in the other sciences in this passage:

A century of agnosticism about the true nature of matter hasn’t found its way deeply enough into other fields, where materialism still appears to be the most sensible way of dealing with the world and, most of all, with the mind. Some neuroscientists think that they’re being precise and grounded by holding tightly to materialist credentials. Molecular biologists, geneticists, and many other types of researchers – as well as the nonscientist public – have been similarly drawn to materialism’s seeming finality.

Yes, he technically calls it materialism, but he seems to basically equate it to reductionism by assuming the other sciences seem fine with being reducible to physics. But, first, Frank should know better from his own colleagues. The solid-state folks in his department work a lot with “emergentism” and point out that the supposedly more reductionist particle people now borrow concepts from them. And he should definitely know from his collaborators at 13.7 that the concept of reducibility is controversial across the sciences. Heck, even physical chemists take issue with being reducible to physics and will point out that QM models can’t fully reproduce aspects of the periodic table. Per the above, it’s worth pointing out that Jerry Fodor, a philosopher of mind and cognitive scientist, who does believe in a computational theory of mind disputes the idea of reductionism


This is funny because this tends to be controversial, not because it’s widely accepted.

Frank’s view on the nature of matter is also confusing. Here he seems to be suggesting “materialism” can really only refer to particulate theories of matter, e.g. something an instrument could definitely touch (in theory). But modern fundamental physics does accept fields and waves as real entities. “Shut up and calculate” isn’t useful for ontology or epistemology, but his professor’s pithy response actually isn’t that. Quantum field theories would agree that “an electron is that we attribute the properties of the electron” since electrons (and any particles) can actually take on any value of mass, charge, spin, etc. as virtual particles (which actually do exist, but only temporarily). The conventional values are what one gets in the process of renormalization in the theory. (I might be misstating that here, since I never actually got to doing QFT myself.) I would say this doesn’t mean electrons aren’t “real” or understood, but it would suggest that quantum fields are ontologically more fundamental than the particles are. If it makes more physical sense for an electron to be a probability wave, that’s bully for probability waves, not a lack of understanding. (Also, aside from experiments showing wave-particle duality, we’re now learning that even biochemistry is dependent on the wave nature of matter.)

I’m also not sure the discussion of wave function collapse does much work here. I don’t get why it would inherently undermine materialism, unless a consciousness interpretation were to win out, and as Frank admits, there’s still not much to support one interpretation over the other. (And even then, again, this could still be solved by a materialist view of consciousness.) He’s also ignoring the development of theories of quantum decoherence to explain wavefunction collapse as quantum systems interact with classical environments, and to my understanding, those are relatively agnostic to interpretation. (Although I think there’s an issue with timescales in quantitative descriptions.)

From there, Frank says we should be open to things beyond “materialism” in describing mind. But like my complaint with the title differences, those arguments don’t really follow from the bulk of the article focusing on philosophical issues in quantum mechanics. Also, he seems open to emergentism in the second to last paragraph. Actually, here I think Frank missed out on a great discussion. I think there are some great philosophy of science questions to be had at the level of QFT, especially with regards to epistemology, and especially directed to popular audiences. Even as a physics major, my main understanding of specific aspects of the framework like renormalization are accepted because “the math works”, which is different than other observables we measure. For instance, the anomalous magnetic moment is a very high precision test of quantum electrodynamics, the quantum field theory of electromagnetism, and our calculation is based on renormalization. But the “unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics” can sometimes be wrong and we might lucky in converging to something close. (Though at this point I might be pulling dangerously close to the Duhem-Quine thesis without knowing much of the technical details.) Instead, we got a mediocre crossover between the question of consciousness and interpretations of quantum mechanics, even though Frank tried hard to avoid turning into “woo”.

Lynn Conway, Enabler of Microchips

Are you using something with a modern microprocessor on International Women’s Day? (If you’re not, but somehow able to see this post, talk to a doctor. Or a psychic.) You should thank Dr. Lynn Conway, professor emerita of electrical engineering and computer science at Michigan and member of the National Academy of Engineering, who is responsible for two major innovations that are ubiquitous in modern computing. She is most famous for the Mead-Conway revolution, as she developed the “design rules” that are used in Very-Large-Scale Integration architecture, the scheme that basically underlies all modern computer chips. Conway’s rules standardized chip design, making the process faster, easier, and more reliable, and perhaps most significant to broader society, easy to scale down, which is why we are now surrounded by computers.


She is less known for her work on dynamic instruction scheduling (DIS). DIS lets a computer program operate out of order, so that later parts of code that do not depend on results of earlier parts can start running instead of letting the whole program stall until certain operations finish. This lets programs run faster and also be more efficient with processor and memory resources. Conway was less known for this work for years because she presented as a man when she began work at IBM. When Conway began her public transition to a woman in 1968, she was fired because the transition was seen as potentially “disruptive” to the work environment. After leaving IBM and completing her transition, Conway lived in “stealth”, which prevented her from publicly taking credit for her work there until the 2000s, when she decided to reach out to someone studying the company’s work on “superscalar” computers in the 60s.

Since coming out, Dr. Conway has been an advocate for trans rights, in science and in society. As a scientist herself, Dr. Conway is very interested in how trans people and the development of gender identity are represented in research. In 2007, she co-authored a paper showing that mental health experts seemed to be dramatically underestimating the number of trans people in the US based just on studies of transition surgeries alone. In 2013 and 2014, Conway worked to make the IEEE’s Code of Ethics inclusive of gender identity and expression.

A good short biography of Dr. Conway can be found here. Or read her writings on her website.

Weirdly Specific Questions I Want Answers to in Meta-science, part 1

Using “meta-science” as a somewhat expansive term for history, philosophy, and sociology of science. And using my blog as a place to write about something besides the physical chemistry of carbon nanomaterials in various liquids.

  • To what extent is sloppy/misleading terminology an attempt to cash in on buzzwords? Clearly, we know that motive exists – there aren’t two major papers trying to narrow down precise definitions of graphene-related terms for nothing. But as the papers also suggest, at what point is it a legitimate debate in the community about setting a definition? “Graphene” was a term that described a useful theoretical construct for decades before anyone ever thought someone could make a real sheet of it, so maybe it isn’t unreasonable that people started using to describe a variety of physical things related to the original idea.
    • This contains a sort of follow-up: What properties do people use in clarifying these definitions and how much does it vary by background? Personally, I would say I’m way closer to the ideal of “graphene” than lots of people working with more extensively chemically modified graphene derivatives and am fine with using it for almost anything that’s nearly all sp2 carbon with about 10 layers or less. But would a physicist who cares more about the electronic properties, and which vary a lot based on the number of layers even in the lower limit, consider that maddening?
  • Nanoscience is very interdisciplinary/transdisciplinary, but individual researchers can be quite grounded in just one field. How much work is being done where researchers are missing basic knowledge of another field their work is now straddling?
    • For instance, when reading up on polymer nanocomposites, it seems noted by lots of people with extensive polymer science backgrounds that there are many papers that don’t refer to basic aspects of polymer physics. My hunch is that a lot of this comes from the fact that many people in this field started working on the nanoparticles they want to incorporate into the composites and then moved into the composites. They may have backgrounds more in fields like solid-state physics, electrical engineering, or (inorganic/metallic/ceramic) materials science, where they would have been less likely to deal with polymer theory.
    • Similarly, it was noted in one paper I read that a lot of talk about solutions of nanoparticles probably would be more precise if the discussion was framed in terminology of colloids and dispersions.

Oh my gosh, I made fun of the subtitle for like two years, but it’s true

  • Is the ontological status of defects in nanoscience distinct from their treatment in bulk studies of materials? This is a bit related to the first question in that some definitions would preclude the existence of some defects in the referent material/structure.
    • On the other hand, does this stricter treatment make more sense in the few atom limit of many nanomaterials? Chemists can literally specify the type and location of every atom in successful products of well-studied cluster reactions, though these are even pushing the term “nano”.
    • Is this a reflection of applications of defects at the different scales? (More philosophically worded, are defects treated differently because of their teleological nature?) At the bulk level, we work to engineer the nature of defects to help develop the properties we want. At the nanoscale, some structures can basically be ruined for certain applications by the mislocation of a single atom. Is this also a reflection of the current practical process of needing to scale up the ability to make nanomaterials? E.g. as more realistic approaches to large-scale nanotech fabrication are developed, will the practical treatment of defects in nanomaterials converge to that of how we treat defects in the bulk?

Using Plants to Turn Pollution into Profits

Once again, I may prove why I’m a poor writer, by burying a lede. But bear with me here, because this will come full circle and yield some fruit. You probably know that urban farming has become more popular over the last decade or so as local eating became trendy. As city dwellers started their own plots, people realized there might be a unique challenge to urban areas: avoiding lead poisoning. (Although a more recent study evidently suggests you’re getting less lead than people expected.) We used lead in lots of things throughout the 20th century, and it easily accumulated in the soil in areas exposed to high doses of some sources – so cities and areas by busy highways have lead from old gas emissions, old lots have lead from old paint, and even old lead pipes and batteries can leach lead into soils. There are other pollutants that can leach into soils in other places. Mercury and cadmium can build up in places where significant amounts of coal are burned, and many mining practices can result in a lot of the relevant metal leaking out into the environment.

Traditionally, the way to deal with polluted soil is to literally dig it all up. This has a major drawback, in that completely replacing a soil patch also means you throw out some nice perks of the little micro-ecosystem that was developed, like root systems that help prevent erosion or certain nutrient sources. Recently, a new technique called phytoremediation has caught on, and as the NYT article points out, it takes advantage of the fact that some plants are really good at absorbing these metals from the soil. We now know of so-called hyperaccumulators of a lot of different metals and a few other pollutants. These are nice because they concentrate the metals for us into parts of the plants we can easily dispose of, and they can help preserve aspects of the soil we like. (And roots can help prevent erosion of the soil into runoff to boot.) Of course, one drawback here is time. If you’re concerned that a plot with lead might end up leaching it into groundwater, you may not want to wait for a few harvests to go by to get rid of it.

But a second drawback seems like it could present an opportunity. A thing that bugged me when I first heard of hyperaccumulators was that disposing of them still seemed to pose lots of problems. You can burn the plants, but you would need to extract the metals from the fumes, or it just becomes like coal and gas emissions all over again. (Granted, it is a bit easier when you have it concentrated in one place.) Or you can just throw away the plants, but again, you need to make sure you’re doing it in a place that will safely keep the metals as the plants break down. When I got to meet someone who studies how metals accumulate in plants and animals last summer, I asked her if there was a way to do something productive with those plants that now had concentrated valuable metals. Dr. Pickering told me this is called “phytomining”, and that while people looked into it, economic methods still hadn’t been developed.

That looks like it may have changed last month, when a team from China reported making multiple nanomaterials from two common hyperaccumulators. The team studied Brassica juncea, which turns out to be mustard greens, and Sedum alfredii, which is a native herb, and both of which are known to accumulate copper and zinc. The plants were taken from a copper-zinc mine in Liaoning Province, China.  The plants were first dissolved in a mix of nitric and perchloric acid, but literally just heating the acid residue managed to make carbon nanotubes. Adding some ammonia to the acid residue formed zinc oxide nanoparticles in the Sedum, and zinc oxide with a little bit of copper in the mustard greens. What’s really interesting is that the structure and shape of the nanotubes seemed to correlate to the size of the vascular bundles (a plant equivalent to arteries/veins) in the different plants.


A nanotube grown from the mustard greens. Source.

But as Dr. Pickering said to me, people have been looking into to this for a while (indeed, the Chinese team has similar papers on this from 5 years ago). What’s needed for phytomining to take off is for it to be economical. And that’s where the end of the paper comes in. First, the individual materials are valuable. The nanotubes are strong and conductive and could have lots of uses. The zinc oxide particles already have some use in solar cells, and could be used in LEDs or as catalysts to help break down organic pollutants like fertilizers. The authors say they managed to make the nanotubes really cheaply compared to other methods: they claimed they could make a kilogram for $120 while bulk prices from commercial suppliers of similar nanotubes is about $600/kg. (And I can’t even find that, because looking at one of my common suppliers, I see multiwalled nanotubes selling on the order of $100 per gram.) What’s really interesting is they claim they can make a composite between the nanotubes and copper/zinc oxide particles that might be even more effective at breaking down pollutants.

I imagine there will be some unforeseen issue in attempting to scale this up (because it seems like there always is). But this is an incredibly cool result. Common plants can help clean up one kind of pollution and be turned into valuable materials to help clean up a second kind of pollution. That’s a win-win.

Comparing Birth Control Trials Today to Those in the 60s Ignores a Sea Change in Research Ethics

Vox has a wonderful article on the recently published male birth control study that is a useful corrective to the narrative that falsely equates it to the original studies of The Pill. Though I say ignore their title, too, because it’s also not that helpful of a narrative either. But the content is useful in arguing against what seems like a terrible and callous framing of the study in most commentary. The key line: “And, yes, the rate of side effects in this study was higher than what women typically experience using hormonal birth control.” Also, can we point out if something like 10 women a year at a school like UVA were committing suicide and it might be linked to a medication they were taking, people would probably be concerned? There’s something disturbing about well-off American women mocking these effects that seemed to disproportionately affect men of color (the most side effects were reported from the Indonesian center, followed by the Chilean center).

My bigger concern here, though, is that most people seem to not understand (or are basically ignoring) how modern research ethics works. For instance, the notion of benefits being weighed in the evaluation of continuing the study aren’t merely the potential benefits of the treatment, but the added benefit of acquiring more data. This was an efficacy study (so I think Phase II, or maybe it was combined Phase I/II, although it might be a really small Phase III trial). It seems like the institutional review board felt enough data had been collected to reach conclusions on efficacy that more data didn’t justify the potential high rate of adverse effects. Which also DOES NOT mean that this treatment has been ruled out forever. The authors themselves recommend further development based on the 75% of participants claiming they would use this birth control method if it were available. I imagine they will tweak the formulation a bit before moving on to further trials. Also, it’s sort of amusing that complaints on this come from people who typically think moves toward regulatory approval are controlled by Big Pharma at the expense of patient health.

Yes, this is different than the initial birth control trials. Yes, the women of Puerto Rico were chosen as human guinea pigs. Though it’s worth pointing out another major factor in choosing Puerto Rico was that it actually had a pretty well organized family planning infrastructure in the 50s and 60s. Admittedly, there’s more racism almost certainly coming into play there, because the politics of family planning were super complicated through the early and mid 20th century and there were definitely overlaps between eugenics and family planning. It’s also worth pointing out the study was encouraged by Margaret Sanger (and earlier studies by Planned Parenthood). Also, the FDA didn’t even initially approve Enovid for contraception because the atmosphere was so repressive back then on reproductive health; it was for menstrual disorders but prescribed off-label for contraception, which is why we know so many women desperately wanted the pill. Heck, even the Puerto Rico study was nominally about seeing if the pill helped with breast cancer. It took another year of discussion by the researchers and companies to get the FDA to finally approve contraception as an on-label use. The company making the pill was actually so concerned about the dosage causing side effects they begged for FDA approval for a lower dose just for contraception (see page 27-28 there) but were rebuffed for another year or two and they refused to market the initial dose for solely for contraception. (Also, to clarify, no one is taking these medications anymore. These versions of the pill were phased out in the 80s.)

Was there sexism at play? Absolutely, and I totally get that. But that doesn’t mean the narrative from 2016 neatly maps onto the narrative of the 1950s and 1960s. Which brings me to my last point. If your view of research ethics is primarily colored by the 1960s, that’s terrifying. You know what else happened at the same time as the initial contraception pill studies? The US government was still letting black men die of syphilis in the name of research. The tissue of Henrietta Lacks was still being cultured without the knowledge or consent of anyone in her family. (And the way they were informed was heartbreaking.) People were unknowingly treated or injected with radioactive material (one of many instances is described here in the segment of testimony by Cliff Honicker). One study involved secretly injecting healthy people with cancer cells, and to prove a theme, those cells were descendants of the ones originally cultured from Henrietta Lacks. Heck, there’s the Milgram experiment and then the Stanford Prison Study was in the 70s. The ethics of human experimentation were a mess for most of the 20th century, and really, most of the history of science. Similarly, medical ethics were very different at the time. Which isn’t to justify those things. But don’t ignore that we’ve been working to make science and research more open, collaborative, and just over the last few decades, and people seem caught up in making humorous or spiteful points than continuing that work right now.

(Other aside, it’s worth pointing out that the comparison here probably does have to be to condoms, which you know, skip the side effects though their typical effectiveness rate is worse. Most of the methods don’t obviously change ejaculate, so unless measuring sperm concentration and motility is a couple’s idea of foreplay, sexual partners who don’t know each other well will still probably want a condom [or unfortunately another method, because yes, the system is sexist and women are expected to do more] as assurance. It’s worth pointing out the study design only worked with “stable” couples who were mutually monogamous and planned on staying together for at least a year during the duration of the study, so there presumably was a high degree of trust in these relationships.)